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NOTE
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM-
SELECTION CLAUSES AFTER STEWART
OR ANIZATION, INC. V RICOH
CORPORATION
The legislators in Alaska and any other state considering statu-
torily validating contractual forum-selection clauses must take into
account the 1988 United States Supreme Court decision in Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation.
In Stewart the Court held that when a suit is brought in federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the balancing test of section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code must be applied to determine whether
the contractual forum-selection clause will be honored to transfer a
case to another jurisdiction. Thus, the issue in Stewart was deter-
mined to be procedural; and the federal courts were given broad dis-
cretion in determining whether or not to enforce a given forum-
selection clause.
This note presents an overview of the historical treatment offo-
rum-selection clauses by the courts in the United States and examines
the implications of the Stewart decision for both the future enforce-
ability of the clauses and the effectiveness of state legislation validat-
ing the clauses. The author calls for federal legislation to ensure the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses between sophisticated busi-
ness parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
To trade or not to trade is a question not seriously pondered by
many state legislatures. Expanding trade is an essential component of
Alaska's and most other states' strategy to improve the wealth and
well-being of their body politic. It is, therefore, not surprising that
legislators search for methods to manipulate the law to the end of en-
couraging trade. New York's statute' validating contractual choice of
Copyright © 1989 by Alaska Law Review
1. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1988). This law vali-
dates a contractual clause choosing New York as the forum state where the contract is
for not less than one million dollars and where there is a choice-of-law provision
designating New York law as the governing law.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
forum clauses is in large part an example of such maneuvering. By
allowing the parties to choose in advance the forum where disputes
will be resolved, forum-selection clauses are seen by many as promot-
ing certainty and predictability in contractual relationships. 2 In draft-
ing General Obligations Law section 5-1402, New York's legislature
was calculating that what was good for contractual relationships was
good for trade.3 Hence, the statute was considered to be unquestiona-
bly justified.4
The purpose of this note is to analyze the effect of the United
States Supreme Court decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp. 5 on the enforceability of contractual choice-of-forum clauses and
on the potency of statutes which attempt to validate such clauses.
Stewart has implications for Alaska and any other states considering
the adoption of forum-selection legislation similar to New York's.
The Court in Stewart declared that forum-selection clauses present is-
sues of federal procedural law, not issues of state law.6 The holding in
Stewart makes it clear that, when a suit is brought in federal court on
the basis of' diversity jurisdiction, the balancing test of section 1404(a)
of the Judicial Code7 must be applied to determine whether the con-
tractual choice-of-forum clause will be honored to transfer a case to
another jurisdiction.8 Thus, state legislation to legalize forum-selec-
tion clauses will influence the enforcement of the clauses only in state
courts. It will take federal legislation if sophisticated commercial par-
ties want to be assured of uniform federal court enforcement of forum-
selection clauses.
2. E.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) ("The
elimination of all ... uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to
both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and con-
tracting."). For the facts of this case, see infra note 10 and accompanying text.
3. See Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for Contractual Disputes:
Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 227, 240-41 (1985) ("Title
14 reflects a legislative intent to maintain New York City's posture as a leading finan-
cial and commercial center and thereby benefit New York state.") (citing Committee
Report, Proposal for Manditory [sic] Enforcement of Governing-Law Clauses and Re-
lated Clauses in Significant Commercial Agreements, 38 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 537
(1983), and Le.tter from New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch to New York Gover-
nor Mario M. Cuomo (July 10, 1984)).
4. See infra notes 66, 73-75, and accompanying text for references to other
states' legislative action with regard to forum-selection clauses.
5. 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
6. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2243. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought.") For a discussion of the requisite
balancing test, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
8. Stewart, 487 U.S. at--, 108 S. Ct. at 2244. See infra note 91 and accompany-
ing text.
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Nonetheless, Alaska and other states may find that there is
enough state court litigation involving choice-of-forum clauses to war-
rant their legislatively validating such clauses as New York has done.
For despite its lack of effectiveness at the federal court level, New
York's General Obligations Law section 5-1402 does ensure that fo-
rum-selection clauses are expeditiously and uniformly enforced in
state courts. Legislation by Alaska and other states to validate forum-
selection clauses at the state level would both promote judicial effi-
ciency and provide a secure contractual environment for commercial
activities.9
II. THE EVOLVING RESPECTABILITY OF FORUM-SELECTION
CLAUSES IN THE COURTS
The turning point for the acceptance of forum-selection clauses
by the American judiciary came with the 1972 Supreme Court deci-
sion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 10 In Zapata, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, stated that "the correct doctrine to be
followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty" is that forum-
selection clauses "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under
the circumstances." 1 Thus, the Court held that where an American
corporation and a German towing firm had contracted to bring all
disputes before the London Court of Justice, that forum-selection
clause should be enforced "specifically unless Zapata could clearly
show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." 12
Zapata therefore established a reasonableness test which courts must
apply to determine the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. In
addition, the Court delegated the burden of proof to the party trying
to void the forum-selection clause.
The decision in Zapata is significant because American courts
historically had looked upon forum-selection clauses with disdain and
9. The focus of this note is on forum-selection clauses in contracts between so-
phisticated business parties, and the conclusions are not meant to apply to clauses in
other contractual situations.
10. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The case involved a suit brought in Florida by Zapata Off-
Shore Company, the American owner of a drilling rig, against the tug, The Bremen,
and Unterweser Reederei GMBH, the German firm hired to tow the rig from Louisi-
ana to Italy. The drilling rig was damaged in international water during a storm. The
question of the enforceability of the forum-selection clause arose when Unterweser
argued that the case should be heard in the contractually chosen forum, London.
11. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 15.
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had refused to enforce them. 13 In general, the rationale given by the
courts for their refusal to honor forum-selection clauses was that the
parties could not contractually "oust appropriate courts of their juris-
diction."' 14 It was also often broadly stated that forum-selection
clauses were "against public policy,"' 5 but the true origins of the
courts' antagonism towards forum-selection clauses are not entirely
clear.' 6 The non-ouster argument, however, has been countered with
the reasoning that the courts are not being ousted by a forum-selection
clause; the courts are merely being asked to exercise their discretion
and not hear the case so that it can be heard in the contractually cho-
sen forum.' 7 In addition, the claim that forum-selection clauses are
"against public policy" has been largely recognized as conclusory.18
Perhaps it is precisely because the arguments against forum-selec-
tion clauses were not founded in solid legal reasoning that exceptions
to the rule developed gradually during the first half of this century.' 9
In fact, in 1903, the same Massachusetts court which was the source of
the non-ouster rule enforced a contractual forum-selection clause,
sending two foreigners to their chosen forum of Italy to have their case
heard.20 In subsequent cases, dicta from Judges Benjamin Cardozo
and Learned Hand also questioned whether forum-selection clauses
should be considered invalid in every instance. Judge Cardozo wrote
in 1914 that "[t]here may conceivably be exceptional circumstances
where resort to the courts of another state is so obviously convenient
13. Excellent discussions of the history of the courts' treatment of forum-selection
clauses can be found in A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 41 at 147-153 (1962); Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Inter-
state Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1, 7-20 (1976); Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum:
"'Prorogation Agreements," 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 414, 430-439 (1961).
14. Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 16, 111 N.E.
678, 680 (1916). The court in Nashua was relying primarily on the earlier decision in
Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Gray 174 (Mass. 1856), which had also refused
to enforce a forum-selection clause.
15. Nute it. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Gray 174, 184 (Mass. 1856).
16. Explanations of the origins of the non-ouster rule vary, including: that the
courts transferred their disdain for arbitration clauses to a similar rejection of forum-
selection clauses, see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 13, at 148; or that the judges were
being paid by the case and for pecuniary reasons were unwilling to transfer cases to
the contractual forum, Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States,
13 AM. 3. CoMP. L. 187, 189 (1964).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 comment a (rev.
1986).
18. See, eg., Gilbert, supra note 13, at 8.
19. See id. at 12-15 and Lenhoff, supra note 13, at 433-34 for the development of
the exceptions to the common law rule.
20. Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903).
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and reasonable as to justify our own courts in yielding to the agree-
ment of the parties and declining jurisdiction. ' 21 Judge Hand gave a
more strongly stated endorsement of forum-selection clauses, although
again only in dictum: "I do not believe that, today at least, there is an
absolute taboo against such contracts at all... they are invalid only
when unreasonable. ' 22 Thus, exceptions to the general disfavor of fo-
rum-selection clauses have a significant history in state and federal
courts.
Finally, in the 1955 case of Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish
American Line Ltd.,23 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit formulated the reasonableness test which was eventually
adopted by the Supreme Court in Zapata. Muller was overruled, how-
ever, when the Second Circuit determined that a federal statute pre-
vented enforcement of the forum-selection clause in that case.24
Nonetheless, Judge Wisdom, dissenting in the court of appeals deci-
sion leading to Zapata, contended that where that federal statute does
not apply, "Muller's 'general principles of contract law' still lead to
Muller's result."' 25 In Zapata, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge
Wisdom 26 and found the not unreasonable forum-selection clause
enforceable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Zapata because the fed-
eral appellate courts were split in their treatment of forum-selection
21. Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 353, 105 N.E. 653,
655 (1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
22. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.,
concurring), cert denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
23. Muller was a case involving an American corporation trying to bring its suit
in the United States despite a contractual clause citing Sweden as the selected forum
for disputes. The Second Circuit concluded that "the jurisdictional agreement was
not unreasonable and that the adherence of the parties to that agreement, which for
aught that appears was freely given, should be given effect." Win. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903
(1955), overruled on other grounds, Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1967).
24. The statute which the Second Circuit decided made the forum-selection clause
unenforceable in Muller was the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-
1315. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1967). There is no
question that "[e]ffect must be denied a choice-of-forum provision in situations where
the provision is invalidated by statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF
LAWS § 80 comment b (rev. 1986) (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 338 U.S.
263 (1949)).
25. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 901 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd
sub nor. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
26. Not only did the Supreme Court agree with Judge Wisdom, but in Zapata
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the strength of Judge Wisdom's dissenting opin-
ion. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10.
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clauses. 27 When Chief Justice Burger announced that the reasonable-
ness test should be applied and that the burden of proof would be
delegated to the party contesting the forum-selection clause, 28 he ad-
dressed a number of the issues affected by the decision. It appeared
that the matter of forum-selection clauses might be settled once and
for all.29
The Chief Justice dismissed the traditional non-ouster argument
as a "vestigial legal fiction,"' 30 and he explained that "[t]he expansion
of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."'3 1
The opinion also detailed the logical components of the Court's justifi-
cation for its decision. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the Court
had already stated that "it is settled.., that parties to a contract may
agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court ... 32
He also referred to several authorities which vindicated implementa-
tion of the reasonableness test:
This approach is substantially that followed in other common-law
countries including England. It is the view advanced by noted
scholars and that adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws. It accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and
reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of American con-
tractors who seek business in all parts of the world.33
As though common law precedent and contractual responsibility were
not justification enough for the Court's decision, Chief Justice Burger
also enumerated the policy rationales: "There are compelling reasons
why a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power.., should
be given full effect."'34 Examples of such "compelling reasons" for im-
plementing the reasonableness test included the uncertainty and possi-
ble inconvenience of not contractually establishing a predetermined
forum for adjudication. Chief Justice Burger maintained that "[t]he
27. Id. at 2 n.1. The Court cites Third and Second Circuit cases upholding fo-
rum-selection clauses and a Fifth Circuit case refusing to enforce a forum-selection
clause: Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1966); Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd.,
224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
28. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
29. See Reese, infra note 49 and accompanying text.
30. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 12.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 11 (quoting National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311, 315-316 (1964)).
33. Id. (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
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elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international
trade, commerce, and contracting. ' 35 The Zapata Court was clearly
encouraging the American legal community to face the realities of the
need for certainty in international transactions in order that America
might continue to benefit from world trade.
The Zapata decision also provides considerable insight into the
appropriate criteria for administering a reasonableness test. The Court
noted that in the Zapata case, the forum-selection clause had been
included in the contract as the result of arm's-length negotiations and
that there had been no showing of fraud or overreaching in the pro-
cess. 36 There were two other criteria of reasonableness cited by the
Court: that enforcement of the clause would not "contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared
by statute or by judicial decision;"' 37 and that the chosen forum not be
"seriously inconvenient. ' 38 As an example of a strong public policy
which would lead to a finding of unreasonableness, the Court pointed
to a case where a forum-selection clause conflicted with the provisions
of a federal statute. 39 The Court also qualified the grounds on which a
forum-selection clause could be found "seriously" inconvenient by ex-
plaining that if inconvenience were foreseeable at the time of
contracting,
it should be incumbent on ,the party seeking to escape his contract
to show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely diffi-
cult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be de-
prived of his day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for
concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold
that party to his bargain.4°
The focus of the Court's examination of the reasonableness of a forum-
selection clause is clearly on maintaining the integrity of contractual
relationships. The same emphasis on the sanctity of the contract is
seen in the Court's allocation of the burden of proof on the party at-
tempting to invalidate the forum-selection clause. In finding that "the
forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be
set aside," 41 the Court was consistently pursuing the Zapata theme:
the American judiciary should respect the intentions of the parties to a
freely negotiated contract.
35. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
36. See supra text accompanying note 12.
37. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 15.
38. Id. at 16 (emphasis in the original).
39. Id. at 15. The case cited by the Court was Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co.,
338 U.S. 263 (1949), where a forum-selection clause was found void because it con-
flicted with a provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
40. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 18.




Despite the apparent thoroughness of the Court's decision in
Zapata, post-Zapata cases have not been uniform in their holdings
with regard to forum-selection clauses. Questions left unanswered in
Zapata have led to divergent interpretations of the Court's intentions
and to scattered state legislative action that attempts to settle uncer-
tainties surrounding forum-selection clauses.42
The main controversy which has surfaced in post-Zapata cases is
whether the holding in Zapata should be narrowly restricted to admi-
ralty decisions or broadly applied to all cases involving the enforce-
ability of forum-selection clauses. This issue most often arises as a
question of whether substantive state contract law or federal proce-
dural law43 should be used to determine the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses in non-admiralty cases in federal courts. The main
distinction between the two approaches is that under contract law, a
state's public policy for or against forum-selection clauses can deter-
mine the outcome of the decision, while under federal law, the Zapata
reasonableness test will be applied.
The best starting place for examining the origins of this contro-
versy is the Court's decision in Zapata, where Chief Justice Burger
wrote for the Court that "such [forum-selection] clauses are prima fa-
cie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. We be-
lieve this is the correct doctrine to be followed by federal district
courts sitting in admiralty." 44 In addition to specifying that the Court
was focusing on an admiralty decision, Chief Justice Burger's justifica-
tion for the Court's holding also emphasized the link between forum-
selection clauses and certainty in international transactions.45 At least
one commentator read Zapata to mean that the Court intended the
reasonableness test to be applied solely to admiralty cases, while "[i]n
the area of general commercial law where state law has control the
decision in Zapata is not of direct assistance."'46
On the other hand, the Zapata Court categorically referred to the
non-ouster argument as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction" 47
and mentioned a broad reliance on "ancient concepts of freedom of
42. See infra text accompanying notes 65-81.
43. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
44. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted).
45. See supra text accompanying note 35.
46. Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to
Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMp. L. 124, 135 (1973) (footnote omitted).
47. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 12.
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contract" 48 as reason to enforce forum-selection clauses. Such gener-
alizations led one commentator to write of Zapata that "[t]his decision
should henceforth be controlling in all areas governed by federal law;
it should also be of persuasive influence in situations where state-law
[sic] controls." 49 The authorities could hardly be further apart in their
interpretations of Zapata.
It is in the courts, however, that one sees the consequences of the
controversy over Zapata's implications for the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses. Just as the commentators have differed over what
Zapata means for forum-selection clauses, so too have the federal
courts been split. Since the 1972 Zapata decision, most of the courts of
appeals have addressed the issue of the enforceability of forum-selec-
tion clauses. 50 The suits are typically brought before a federal court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, by a party unwilling to take the
case to the contractually chosen forum. The defendant then moves to
dismiss or transfer the case in reliance on the forum-selection clause.
It has not gone unnoticed by the courts that "[w]hether a con-
tractual forum selection clause is substantive or procedural is a diffi-
cult question. On the one hand the clause determines venue and can
be considered procedural, but on the other, choice of forum is an im-
portant contractual right of the parties." 51 That statement by the
Eighth Circuit in Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Com-
modities, Inc. was followed by its conclusion that "[b]ecause of the
close relationship between substance and procedure in this case we be-
lieve that consideration should have been given to the public policy of
Missouri."' 52 Thus, if forum-selection clauses are a state law issue, the
state's public policy can guide the federal courts in their determination
48. Id. at 11.
49. Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses,
7 INT'L LAW. 530, 530 (1973).
50. See ag., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988);
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1986); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.
1986); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315
(4th Cir. 1982); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1982); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.
1981); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979); Fireman's Fund
Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1974); Snider
v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d
1215 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting
Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984 and 1988
Supp.), for cases dealing with forum-selection clauses in the district and state courts.
51. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848,
852 (8th Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 852.
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of the enforceability of the clauses. 53 The Farmland court cites with
approval a Third Circuit case, General Engineering Corp. v. Martin
Marietta Alumina, Inc., 5 4 which had been decided earlier that same
year.
In General Engineering, the court declared that "[w]e must cor-
rect the assumption that federal courts are bound as a matter of fed-
eral common law to apply [the Zapata] standard to forum selection
clauses. The construction of contracts is usually a matter of state, not
federal, common law." 55 Unlike the Eighth Circuit which proceeded
to apply state law in Farmland, 56 the Third Circuit in General Engi-
neering applied the Zapata reasonableness test, because of "the ab-
sence of Maryland precedents on the enforceability of a forum-
selection clause."' 57 Nonetheless, had there been state law to apply, it
appears that the Third Circuit would have done so.
The analysis of the courts in Farmland and General Engineering
is in direct contradiction to the approach used in other federal appel-
late courts. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has concluded that
"[a]lthough [Zapata] involved an international forum selection ques-
tion, and the Court emphasized the commercial realities of interna-
tional trade, we see no reason why the principles announced in
[Zapata] are not equally applicable to the domestic context. s58 The
Second and Eleventh Circuits have used precisely the same argument
that nothing precludes application of Zapata to cases involving forum-
53. The argument that the determination of the enforceability of forum-selection
clauses is a state-law contracts question is also set out in Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
133, 155 ("The interpretation and enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a con-
tract arguably should not depend on whether the plaintiff happens to commence ac-
tion in a state court or, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, in a federal court.").
54. 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 356 (cited with approval in Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F.
Supp. 977, 981 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988)). In General
Engineering the Third Circuit was in effect reversing its earlier statement that "[t]he
Supreme Court in [Zapata] ... appears to have assumed without saying so that in a
federal forum the enforceability of a forum selection clause is determined by a gener-
ally applicable federal law." Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709
F.2d 190, 201 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
56. Farmland, 806 F.2d at 852. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672
F.Supp. 977, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1987), also applied state law to determine the enforce-
ability of the forum-selection clause.
57. General Engineering v. Martin Marietta, 783 F.2d at 358.
58. Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 279
(9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit cites cases from five other federal appellate courts
in support of its reliance on Zapata to enforce a forum-selection clause in a domestic
situation. Id.
[Vol. 6:175
1989] FOR UM-SELECTION CLA USES 185
selection clauses even where there are no international implications.5 9
Federal appellate courts relying on Zapata have given effect to forum-
selection clauses in situations where the chosen forum was another
federal court, 60 a state court,61 or a court overseas.62 In addition to
their relying reciprocally on each other's decisions, these courts are
also supported in their view by the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws section 80, which states that "[t]he parties' agreement as to the
place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such
an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." 63
Thus, there is at least a certain sector of the American legal commu-
nity which has progressed from the nineteenth-century abhorrence of
forum-selection clauses to a current general acceptance thereof.64
59. Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir.
1982); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069 (1lth Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
60. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1066.
61. Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 273.
62. Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.
1981).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). Section 80 of
the Restatement is often cited by federal appellate courts looking for justification for
enforcing a forum-selection clause. See, eg., Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 279. It should be
noted that in the 1986 revisions of the Restatement, the non-ouster language has been
dropped from section 80, although the comment still explains that "[p]rivate individu-
als... may not by their contract oust a state of any jurisdiction it would otherwise
possess." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 comment a (rev.
1986).
64. Alaska is among the states whose common law appears to have accepted the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses. See Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan,
GMBH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, Klippan, GMBH v. Volkswagen-
werk of America, Inc., 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Societe Jean Nicolas et Fils v. Mousseux,
123 Ariz. 59, 597 P.2d 541 (1979); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain and Assocs., Inc., 277
Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Los
Angeles County, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976); ABC
Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Funding Sys. Leas-
ing Corp. v. Diaz, 34 Conn. Supp. 99, 378 A.2d 108 (1977); Ella Corp. v. Paul N.
Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437
(Fla. 1986); Calanca v. D & S Mfg. Co., 157 II. App. 3d 85, 510 N.E.2d 21 (1987);
Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Ernest
and Norman Hart Bros., Inc. v. Town Contractors, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 463 N.E.2d
355 (1984) (acknowledging modem trend toward enforcing forum-selection clauses
but declining to do so for equitable reasons); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-
Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1982); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Bodell,
132 Mont. 243, 316 P.2d 788 (1957); Haakinson & Beaty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 216
Neb. 426, 344 N.W.2d 454 (1984); Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow Dynamics, Inc.,
122 N.J. Super. 456, 300 A.2d 856 (1973); Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad
Financiere de Comercio, C.A., 128 Misc. 2d 564, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1985); United
Standard Management Corp. v. Mahoning Valley Solar Resources, Inc., 16 Ohio App.
3d 476, 476 N.E.2d 724 (1984); Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 262 Or. 95, 495 P.2d 729
(1972); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 209 A.2d 810
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO POST-ZAPATA
UNCERTAINTIES
Due to the courts' divergent treatments of forum-selection
clauses, such clauses can hardly instill a contracting party with any
sense of certainty. Whether or not a forum-selection clause ultimately
will be enforced may well depend on where the party contesting the
clause brings suit. It is, therefore, not surprising that there has been
legislative action attempting to validate forum-selection clauses and
ensure theix enforcement. In the era between Zapata and Stewart,
however, the effect state laws validating forum-selection clauses would
have in suits brought to federal courts in diversity remained unclear.
A now defunct Model Choice of Forum Act65 was adopted by
three states66 before its withdrawal by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1975.67 The Model Choice of Forum Act essentially
sought to validate properly obtained forum-selection clauses unless to
do so would be unreasonable, substantially inconvenient, against some
other statutory provision, or depriving the plaintiff of all effective rem-
edies. 68 The Model Choice of Forum Act was withdrawn by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws because of the dearth of adopting
states, and because "an agreement valid under the Act may be subject
to constitutional question under D.iI. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co." 69
(1965); St. John's Episcopal Mission Center v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Serv.,
276 S.C. 507, 280 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Green v. Clinic Masters, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 813
(S.D. 1978); Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378
(Tenn. 1983) (finding forum-selection clauses generally valid but declining to enforce
this one on reasonableness standard); International Collection Serv., Inc. v. Gibbs, 147
Vt. 105, 510 A.2d 1325 (1986); Exum v. Vantage Press, Inc., 17 Wash. App. 477, 563
P.2d 1314 (1977); State ex rel. Kuhn v. Luchsinger, 231 Wis. 533, 286 N.W. 72
(1939). See also Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011
(S.D.W.Va. 1976). Seven states continue to find forum-selection clauses unenforce-
able: Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980); Cartridge Rental
Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 748, 209 S.E.2d 132 (1974);
McCarty v. Herrick, 41 Idaho 529, 240 P. 192 (1925); Davenport Mach. & Foundry
Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1982); Bartlett v. Union Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500 (1859); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 182 N.C. 498, 109
S.E. 362 (1921); Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 468 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971).
65. The text of the Model Choice of Forum Act can be found in 17 AM. J. COMP.
L. 292, 294-95 (1969).
66. The three states which adopted versions of the Model Choice of Forum Act
are Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-413
to 25-417 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508-A (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
04.1 (1974).
67. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 142, 142 (1975).
68. Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 292, 294-95 (1969).
69. Id.
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In Overmeyer, 70 the issue was the constitutionality of the enforcement
of a cognovit note which had been negotiated between two sophisti-
cated corporate parties, and the Supreme Court found that a "cogno-
vit clause is not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due
process. '71 The Court did, however, explain that cognovit clauses
could violate due process in certain fact situations, such as where there
was a contract of adhesion, greatly unequal bargaining power, or lack
of consideration. 72 Apparently, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws were concerned that the Model Choice of Forum Act was so
broadly applicable that eventually it would be found unconstitution-
ally to endorse depriving unsuspecting and unsophisticated con-
tracting parties of their procedural rights.
In contrast to the unpalatably broad reach of the Model Choice of
Forum Act, New York's General Obligations Law section 5-140273
permits bringing a foreign corporation or nonresident into court only
where: (1) there is a contractual forum-selection clause; (2) the con-
tract is for not less that one million dollars; and (3) the contract has a
provision designating New York law as the governing law.74 Thus far,
California appears to be the only state with a statute like New York's,
limiting the law's effect to large commercial contracts, and linking
contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum requirements. 75
70. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
71. Id. at 187.
72. Id. at 188.
73. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1988). See supra note 1
and accompanying text. The relevant substantive subsection of § 5-1402 states:
1. Notwithstanding any act which limits or affects the right of a person to
maintain an action or proceeding, including, but not limited to, paragraph(b) of section thirteen hundred fourteen of the business corporation law and
subdivision two of section two hundred-b of the banking law, any person
may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign corporation, non-
resident, or foreign state where the action or proceeding arises out of or
relates to any contract, agreement or undertaking for which a choice of New
York law has been made in whole or in part pursuant to section 5-1401 and
which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise,
in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction
covering in the aggregate, not less than one million dollars, and (b) which
contains a provision or provisions whereby such foreign corporation or non-
resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
Id.
74. Id.
75. The California statute is the same as New York's without the prefatory refer-
ences to other New York Laws. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.40 (West Supp. 1988).
Legislation validating forum-selection clauses should not be confused with statutory
approval of parties agreeing to a certain venue. The former implies an agreement to
submit to the jurisdiction of the chosen forum; the latter does not.
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These statutes in New York and California are obviously control-
ling in their state courts,76 but it has been unclear whether federal
courts need to pay any heed to the state legislation. If forum-selection
clauses raise procedural issues, then federal law will guide the federal
courts in their determination of the enforceabilty of the clauses, and it
is possible that the state legislation will be ignored by the federal
courts.
On the other hand, if federal courts apply the Zapata standard,
and the forum-selection clauses are held to be valid unless unreason-
able, the reasonableness of the contract clauses would be supported by
the existence of state legislation such as New York's General Obliga-
tions Law section 5-1402. Sophisticated parties can be assumed to
have known about the New York legislation when they chose New
York as a forum and New York's law as governing law. There would
have to be a strong showing of fraud or undue influence for such a
forum-selection clause to be found to be unreasonable.77
Even ifa federal court taking a case in diversity decides to rely on
the state's public policy to determine the enforceability of a forum-
selection clause, it could be argued that the legislation is a strong indi-
cation of the state's policy of enforcing the clauses. Alternatively, the
point can be made that, in the interest of uniformity of contract inter-
pretation, the state statutes should govern the decision of a federal
court sitting in diversity. In each of the cases there will be a contrac-
tual choice-of-law provision which is generally enforced.78 To refuse
to enforce the forum-selection clause would be to defy the contractual
expectations of the parties. As one author has put it:
If a state court enforces a forum-selection clause which chooses an-
other jurisdiction and therefore dismisses an action, why should a
federal court sitting in the excluded jurisdiction and having jurisdic-
tion on the basis of diversity of citizenship reach a different result,
entertain the action and apply the laws of the excluded
jurisdiction?79
76. See, eg., Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio,
C.A., 128 Misc. 2d 564, 572, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) ("[P]ublic
policy favors New York courts retaining lawsuits where New York is the designated
forum. The center of world banking, trade, finance and other activities should, and
indeed, with the enactment of General Obligations Law Sec. 5-1402, must extend itself
to treat with [sic] such controversies.") (emphasis added).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
78. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18.1, 18.2, at 632-36 (1982
& Supp. 1986) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971), the
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105, and cases supporting the proposition that a con-
tractual choice of law clause will be enforced, although "ordinarily the chosen law
must bear some reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction. . .
79. Gruson, supra note 53, at 155.
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Thus, in the post-Zapata period, with or without the presence of
state legislation, the disparity in the methodology used to determine
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses meant that, as legal in-
struments which were supposed to enhance certainty and predictabil-
ity in contractual relationships, the clauses were failures. In 1988,
sixteen years after the decision in Zapata, 80 the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of forum-selection clauses when it decided Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.81 Stewart, however, can hardly be
said to have resolved all of the ambiguities surrounding forum-selec-
tion clauses.
V. STEWART SETTLES ONLY ONE POST-ZAPATA CONTROVERSY
Hearing Stewart gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to clear
away some of the confusion surrounding the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses. It is not at all certain, however, that the Court's
decision in Stewart has resolved anything beyond the one question of
how a federal court sitting in diversity should deal with a motion to
transfer a case which involves a contractual forum-selection clause. In
deciding that such a motion to transfer was a procedural issue con-
trolled by section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code,8 2 the Court abstained
from making a policy statement about the validity of forum-selection
clauses. Stewart has done little to enhance the predictability of the
outcome when a forum-selection clause is at issue in a federal court.
The Stewart facts and procedural history are fairly representative
of cases involving controversies over forum-selection clauses. An Ala-
bama firm, the Stewart Organization, brought essentially a breach of
contract suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama against Ricoh Corporation, a New Jersey corporation
which conducts a considerable portion of its business in New York.8 3
80. In the years intervening between Zapata and Stewart, the one case the
Supreme Court decided with reference to forum-selection clauses was Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Company, 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In Scherk the Supreme Court stated
that "[ain agreement to arbitrate before a special tribunal is, in effect, a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause.. ." and held that "the agreement of the parties in this
case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction
is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provi-
sions of the Arbitration Act." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20. Scherk is generally viewed
as a narrow decision mandating the enforcement of forum-selection clauses where
there is federal legislation to that regard. See, eg., General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin
Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986).
81. 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) is the federal authorization for transfer on the
basis of convenience and justice. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
83. Stewart, 487 U.S. at--, 108 S. Ct. at 2241 ("The core of the complaint was an
allegation that respondent had breached the dealership agreement, but petitioner also
included claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations.").
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The contract between the Stewart Organization and Ricoh Corpora-
tion contained clauses designating courts in New York City as the
chosen forum and New York law as the governing law.84 Ricoh Cor-
poration moved that the case be transferred or dismissed in order to
enforce the forum-selection clause. The district court denied the mo-
tions to transfer or dismiss, finding that the question was controlled by
Alabama law and that Alabama law holds forum-selection clauses to
be against public policy.85 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
after vacating a decision to enforce the forum-selection clause, decided
en banc that federal law was applicable to this procedural question and
that the forum-selection clause was enforceable under the standards of
Zapata. 8 6
In its decision, the Supreme Court specifically narrowed the focus
of the inquiry, determining that "[t]his case presents the issue whether
a federal court sitting in diversity should apply state or federal law in
adjudicating a motion to transfer a case to a venue provided in a con-
tractual forum-selection clause."' 87 Although the Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals' holding that the district court was wrong
in applying state law, the Court explicitly distanced itself from the
methodology used by the Eleventh Circuit.88 More specifically, the
Court's decision states:
[W]e disagree with the [court of appeals'] articulation of the rele-
vant inquiry as "whether the forum selection clause in this case is
unenforceable under the standards set forth in [Zapata]." . . .
Rather, the first question for consideration should have been
whether section 1404(a) itself controls the respondent's request to
give effect to the parties' contractual choice of venue and transfer
this case to a Manhattan court.89
The Supreme Court easily concluded that section 1404(a) of the Judi-
cial Code,90 the federal authorization of transfer on the basis of con-
venience and justice, was broad enough to control the district court's
decision.91 After explaining that implementation of section 1404(a)
requires the district court to conduct a balancing test taking into con-
sideration the facts of each case, the Court stated that "[t]he flexible
84. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239
(1988).
85. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2241.
86. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1068-71.
87. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2240-41.
88. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2243.
89. Id.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought.").
91. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2243-45.
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and individualized analysis Congress prescribed in section 1404(a)
thus encompasses consideration of the parties' private expression of
their venue preferences."' 92 In Stewart, therefore, it is neither state law
nor federal law according to Zapata which controls the enforceability
of the forum-selection clause. In such a suit in federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, where there is a motion to transfer in
order to enforce a forum-selection clause, the issue is governed by fed-
eral law under section 1404(a).
VI. ENFORCEABILITY REMAINS UNPREDICTABLE
AFTER STEWART
93
In Stewart, the Supreme Court reinforced procedural uniformity
without commenting on any need for consistency of contract interpre-
tation. The balancing test applied under a section 1404(a) transfer
motion will not guarantee the enforcement of a contractual forum-
selection clause no matter how reasonable it may be. The overall va-
lidity of the clauses is further weakened because the burden of proof
under Stewart is on the party trying to enforce the forum-selection
clause. In addition, Stewart addressed only the narrow issue of dealing
with a motion to transfer based on a forum-selection clause; little guid-
ance is provided in Stewart on how a forum-selection clause should
influence a decision when the motion is for dismissal rather than trans-
fer.94 In the absence of such guidance from the Supreme Court, the
lower courts are left to continue their polemics over whether the en-
forcement of a forum-selection clause is a contract issue governed by
state law or a federal procedural issue to which the Zapata reasonable-
ness test applies. Altogether, under Stewart, contracts become equivo-
cal and the contracting parties lose predictability and certainty in their
relationship.
92. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.
93. Post-Stewart federal cases involving forum-selection clauses already abound.
See, e.g., Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988); Red Bull
Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988); Weidner
Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.
1988); Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elec. (Canada) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4 (3d
Cir. 1988); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir.
1988); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988);
Crescent Int'l, Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1988); TUC
Elec., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35 (D. Conn. 1988); First
Interstate Leasing Serv. v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
94. The only direction provided by the Court is found in a footnote indicating
that a motion to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) should be
denied where venue is proper, as it usually is in cases protesting implementation of
forum-selection clauses. The Court says nothing about motions to dismiss based on
other grounds. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2243 n.8.
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Four months after the Stewart decision, the Second Circuit had
already concluded that "[p]ost the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Stewart, it is clear that a district court has even broader discretion to
decide transfer motions under § 1404(a) than was provided by
[Zapata]."9:5 Whereas in Zapata the Supreme Court gave fairly spe-
cific guidelines for the determination of the "reasonableness" of a fo-
rum-selection clause,96 it is widely acknowledged that "[t]he three
factors mentioned in [section 1404(a)], convenience of parties and wit-
nesses and the interest of justice, are broad generalities that take on a
variety of meanings in specific cases."' 97 In Stewart, the Court did ex-
plain that "[t]he presence of a forum-selection clause . . will be a
significant factor that figures centrally in the District Court's
calculus;" 98 however, the Court's acknowledgement of the importance
of enforcing a contractual commitment could have been stronger, as it
was in Zapata.99
The post-Stewart federal court decisions which have looked at fo-
rum-selection clauses indicate that contracting parties cannot rely on
the enforceability of the clauses. The broadened discretion of the dis-
trict court is one reason for this uncertainty with regard to the en-
forcement of the clauses. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in Sparling
v. Hoffman Construction Co., Inc., 100 has deemed it appropriate for the
district court to have transferred a case to a forum other than the one
which was contractually chosen. In Sparling, the district court in
Washington transferred the suit to Anchorage, Alaska, even though
95. Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 for a discussion of Zapata's three
factors for determining reasonableness: arm's-length negotiations absent a showing of
fraud or overreaching; no contravention of a strong public policy of the forum; and no
showing that the chosen forum would be "seriously" inconvenient. See also
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983) for an
enumeration of nine factors applied by federal courts to determine the enforceability
of forum-selection clauses.
97. 15 C. 'WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3847 (1986). For comparison's sake, it should be noted that the district
court's discretionary power under § 1404(a) is considered to be greater than that
under a forum non conveniens decision. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32
(1955).
98. Stewant, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.
99. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, was more willing than the rest of
the Court to give greater weight to a forum-selection clause in a § 1404(a) balancing
test. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, J.)("[T]he authority and prerogative of the federal courts to determine the issue, as Con-
gress has directed by § 1404(a), should be exercised so that a valid forum selection
clause is given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.") (quoting
Zapata, 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)).
100. 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Kenai, Alaska, was the contractually chosen forum. The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not cite Stewart, but it relied on section 1404(a) of the Judicial
Code for its allocation of discretion to the district court. 10 1 When the
case of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. came before the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Alabama on remand,10 2 that
court denied Ricoh Corporation's motion to transfer the suit to the
Southern District of New York. After considering what it found to be
the relevant factors of convenience and justice as required under sec-
tion 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, the district court stated:
Not only because of the presumption favoring a plaintiff's
choice of forum and Ricoh's failure here to present evidence suffi-
cient to rebut that presumption, but because both the private and
public interests militate against a transfer to Manhattan, this court
concludes that the Northern District of Alabama is an entirely ap-
propriate forum for trying this action.103
Although the district court admitted that "[i]n this case, the forum-
selection clause facially indicates a meeting of the minds to the effect
that New York is the proper forum,"''1 4 it was the court's opinion that
"[t]he north slope [of Alaska] contains as many witnesses and docu-
ments and contacts bearing on this controversy as Manhattan
does."105 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals must now decide
whether it was within the district court's discretion under section
1404(a) to determine that factors of the convenience of the plaintiff's
chosen forum outweighed the factors of contractual justice.
The district court's analysis in Stewart on remand brings to the
fore another result of the Supreme Court's Stewart decision. In Stew-
art, not only did the Supreme Court signal that the district courts have
broader discretion than under the Zapata reasonableness test, but the
burden of proof was shifted. The party trying to enforce the forum-
selection clause bears the burden of proof under Stewart, whereas in
cases governed by Zapata that burden is on the party contesting the
enforceability of the forum-selection clause. Such burden-shifting con-
siderably undermines the validity of all forum-selection clauses and
sends a signal of the unreliability of the clauses to all contracting
parties.
Finally, the Supreme Court's narrow focus on motions to transfer
in Stewart means that the lower courts are still without direction in
101. Id. at 14.
102. 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
103. Id. at 591.




cases where a forum-selection clause is the basis for a motion to dis-
miss. In a footnote, the Supreme Court did provide a general re-
minder of how to deal with cases which do not fall under the Stewart
holding:
If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the District
Court then proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal
judge-made law would disserve the so-called "twin aims of the Erie
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequita-
ble administration of the laws.... ." If application of federal judge-
made law would disserve these two policies, the District Court
should apply state law.106
The lower courts, however, have not found the Supreme Court's in-
structions particularly helpful in determining whether state law or fed-
eral law governs their decision about a motion to dismiss a suit in
order that a forum-selection clause might be enforced.10 7 In a post-
Stewart case dealing with just such a motion to dismiss, the Third Cir-
cuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's reference to meeting Erie's
twin aims.10 8 Rather than determine exactly how to apply the
Supreme Court's advice, the Third Circuit found that: "Fortunately,
we need not resolve this unanswered question of whether federal law,
the law of the forum state, the law of Canada, or one of its provinces
applies. All of these jurisdictions look favorably on forum selection
clauses." ° On the other hand, in a case before it on a motion to
dismiss, the Ninth Circuit has emphatically concluded that "the fed-
eral procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly
outweigh the state interests, and the federal rule announced in
[Zapata] controls enforcement of forum clauses in diversity cases."110
In short, most of the post-Zapata controversies have reappeared in a
post-Stewart guise, and the reliability of contractual forum-selection
clauses remains questionable.
106. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2243 (footnote omitted). The omitted
citation is to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 42-64.
108. Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elec., 859 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1988).
109. IdI (footnote omitted). On a motion to dismiss in order to enforce a forum-
selection clause, the Seventh Circuit has also avoided the problem of deciding whether
state or federal law applies by finding the result would be the same in either case.
Weidner Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302,
1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Ninth Circuit relies in part on Justice Kennedy's statement in his concurring
opinion in Stewart that forum-selection clauses should be "given controlling weight in
all but the most exceptional cases." See supra note 99.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The similarities between the post-Zapata and post-Stewart con-
troversies over the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in federal
courts indicate that the Supreme Court does not feel competent to leg-
islate in this area. The Zapata Court had the authority to create the
reasonableness rule because of the federal courts' role as significant
lawmakers with regard to admiralty questions;"1 however, in the
Stewart decision, the Supreme Court refused to accept such a role in
non-admiralty diversity cases. Yet without legislation in this field, fo-
rum-selection clauses are unreliable to an extent probably not fully
appreciated by most contracting parties.
Alaska and other states may find legislation such as that in New
York useful if their state courts frequently have to deal with the ques-
tion of the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in commercial
contracts. The effectiveness of such state statutes, however, is limited
to litigation in the state courts. If the Supreme Court will not squarely
address the issue at the federal court level, then congressional legisla-
tion is required, just as it was to legitimize arbitration clauses. 112 The
Zapata Court's determination of the need to promote trade and ensure
certainty and predictability in contractual relationships applies equally
to non-admiralty commerce. When sophisticated commercial parties
contractually agree ahead of time to a forum for the settlement of their
disputes, there is no rational substantive justification for not holding
them to that agreement.
Phoebe Kornfeld
POSTSCRIPT
As this note went to press, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
announced its decision on the petition which had been fied by Ricoh
Corporation seeking a writ of mandamus to compel transfer to New
York of the case of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 1 3 The
court of appeals issued the writ, thereby granting enforcement of the
forum-selection clause in the contract between Stewart Organization
and Ricoh Corporation.
In its per curiam decision, the court of appeals relied on both the
Supreme Court's holding in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
111. See T. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 4-1 (1987).
112. The comparison between arbitration clauses and forum-selection clauses is not
new. See supra note 16. In the immediate post-Zapata period there was recognition
that, as had been the case with arbitration clauses, the ultimate assurance for the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses would depend on federal legislation. See
Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 135.
113. In re Ricoh Corp., No. 88-7694 (1lth Cir. Apr. 3, 1989) (per curiam).
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Corp. 114 and on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in that case.11
The court of appeals first determined that when a motion to transfer
under section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code involves an attempt to en-
force a forum-selection clause, the burden of persuasion is on the party
trying to prevent transfer to the contractually chosen forum.' 16 Thus,
the district court was found to be incorrect when it deferred to Stewart
Organization's choice of forum in Alabama, because doing so would
"only encourage parties to violate their contractual obligations, the
integrity of which are vital to our judicial system."' 7
The court of appeals also found that the district court had not
properly followed the Supreme Court's instructions for analyzing the
1404(a) convenience question. Whereas the district court had deliber-
ated whether the plaintiff's chosen forum, Alabama, was a convenient
forum, the court of appeals pointed out that the Supreme Court di-
rected the district court to consider "the convenience of a Manhattan
forum given the parties' expressed preference for that venue, and the
fairness of transfer in light of the forum selection clause and the par-
ties' relative bargaining power."1 18
In addition, the court of appeals emphasized the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that a "choice of forum clause is 'a significant factor
that figures centrally in the District Court's calculus.'"119 Finding
that in the facts there was no" 'exceptional' situation in which judicial
enforcement of a contractual choice of forum clause would be im-
proper,"120 the court of appeals concluded that the district court had
abused its discretion when it refused to transfer the case to the con-
tractually chosen forum.
The discrepancy between the holdings of the District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequent to the Supreme Court's Stewart decision epito-
mizes the problems which will continue to plague parties trying to
enforce forum-selection clauses. As discussed above in Section VI,121
not all of the courts of appeals will be as willing as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit to rely so heavily on the strong presumption in favor of enforcing
114. 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
115. Id. at-, 108 S. Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor,
J.).
116. In re Ricoh Corp., No. 88-7694 at 4.
117. Id. (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2249).
118. Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2244 (quoted in In re Ricoh Corp., No.
88-7694 at 4-5) (emphasis added by the court of appeals in In re Ricoh Corp.).
119. In re Ricoh Corp., No. 88-7694 at 5 (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S.
Ct. at 2244) (emphasis added by the court of appeals in In re Ricoh Corp.).
120. Id. at 6 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2250 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 95-110 for a discussion of the post-Stewart
debate as it has already manifested itself in the federal courts.
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forum-selection clauses that was expressed by only two Justices in the
concurring opinion in Stewart. 122 In the absence of any federal legisla-
tion on the issue, it cannot be long before the Supreme Court is once
again asked to settle some of these controversies; however, there is
little indication that the Supreme Court will focus on the substantive
issue and support the principle of the enforcement of contractual
obligations.
122. Stewart, 487 U.S. at--, 108 S. Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined
by O'Connor, J.).
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